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Abstract: The many growing migratory flows render our societies increasingly heterogeneous. From
the point of view of social welfare, achieving all the positive effects of diversity appears as a challenge
for our societies. Nevertheless, while it is true that ethnolinguistic diversity involves costs and
benefits, at a country level it seems that the former are greater than the latter, even more so when
income inequality between ethnic groups is taken into account. In this respect, there is a vast literature
at a macro level that shows that ethnolinguistic fragmentation induces lower income, which leads to
the conclusion that part of the difference in income observed between countries can be attributed to
their different levels of fragmentation. This paper presents primary evidence of the role of education
in mitigating the adverse effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the level of income. While the
results show a negative association between fragmentation and income for all indices of diversity,
the attainment of a certain level of education, especially secondary and tertiary, manages to reverse
the sign of the marginal effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on income level. Since current
societies are increasingly diverse, these results could have major economic policy implications.
Keywords: ethnolinguistic diversity; fractionalization; ethnic inequality; social cohesion; education;
income per capita
1. Introduction
According to the data of the World Bank, on average, the GDP per capita in high-income countries
was over 20 times higher than that of low-income countries. Explaining the sources of these astonishing
differences in the income per capita across countries constitutes one of most challenging issues in
Macroeconomics. We can look at this in greater detail. If the Central African Republic is compared
with another African country, such as Botswana, we realize that in the 1960s the income per capita of
the former was higher than the income per capita of the latter country. Nevertheless, at the beginning
of the 1970s, Botswana overtook the Central African Republic, and from then to 2018 the growth rate of
the Central African Republic has been −44.07%, for Botswana this has been 1019.49%, while Singapore,
one of the richest countries in 2018, “only” grew 748% in the same period.
The success of Botswana has attracted the attention of many researchers. Robinson et al. [1] have
highlighted the role of inclusive institutions, which brings us directly to the crucial issue, namely,
what has enabled the development of these types of institutions. Although this question has many
answers, since the contribution of Easterly and Levine [2], the issue of the ethnolinguistic diversity
has become to be one of the most relevant. Based on the data provided by Alesina et al. [3], the index
of ethnic fractionalization for Central African Republic is the double that of Botswana (0.82 against
0.41). Likewise, this index is over 0.8 for other low-income countries like Chad (0.86), Liberia (0.90) or
Madagascar (0.87). A simple descriptive analysis show that the average for different ethnolinguistic
diversity indices decreases from low-income to high-income countries (see Appendix A, Tables A3
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and A8). In fact, a growing number of cross-country studies have tested the negative impact of
ethnolinguistic diversity on income and on several aspects of economic performance, such as economic
growth [3], income distribution [4], unemployment rate [5], and quality of institutions [6]. In an
increasingly heterogeneous world, these results are alarming. They highlight the potential detrimental
effects of diversity, which can foster xenophobic attitudes, which, in the end, are those that are really
harmful to society as a whole.
Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, ethnic diversity presents not only costs but also benefits
since diversity implies a variety of skills that results in greater productivity [7]. These positive effects
are more salient when empirical studies are conducted at a micro level. Furthermore, Putnam [8]
argues that, despite the negative effects that could arise from ethnic heterogeneity in the short run,
diversity could show benefits in the long run, if we learn to handle diversity properly. In other words,
the key point is not the ethnic diversity itself, but the way in which society manages said ethnic
diversity. As Alesina and Zhuravskaya ([6], p. 1872) assert, “What makes different countries more or
less capable of handling diversity, or even benefiting from it, remains an open question.” In an effort to
answer this question, Van Staveren and Pervaiz [9] point out that social cohesion plays a key role in
gaining all the benefits from diversity. Along these lines, Buitrago et al. Buitrago et al. [10] show that
tolerance overcomes the negative effects of ethnolinguistic diversity on institutional quality.
On this basis, our aim is to show that the benefits of diversity are greater than costs if the population
attains a certain level of education, since this plays a key role in achieving social cohesion, because
education provides the means to be more tolerant and cooperative [11,12]. This allows diversity
to boost productivity and innovation and to avoid any conflicts that would otherwise arise due to
a lack of understanding between the different ethnolinguistic groups. This ultimately leads to the
disappearance of the negative impact of ethnic diversity, even at a macro level.
In short, this paper strives to answer three questions:
(1) Can education manage to alleviate the adverse effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance?
(2) Is education capable of reversing these adverse effects even when the diversity indices that
consider distance between groups are included in the analysis?
(3) Which level of education is required in order to overcome the possible adverse effects of
ethnolinguistic diversity?
In order to answer these questions, we use a sample of 116 developing and developed countries.
For the measurement of diversity, we consider the indices of fractionalization of Alesina et al. [3] and
Montalvo and Querol [13], which are widely used in the literature. These indices fail to take into
account the degree of difference between groups, and therefore new indices have been developed that
measure the distance among groups from a variety of perspectives. These perspectives include those
that consider factors that are cultural [14], physical (segregation index of Alesina and Zhuravskaya [6]),
the size of the groups (polarization indices of Montalvo and Querol [13], Esteban and Ray [15], Desmet
et al. [16]), or income inequality [17]. From these approaches, we have chosen the latter based on the
results of Alesina et al. [17]. These authors document a strong negative association between ethnic
inequality (an index that measures the economic differences between ethnicities coexisting in the same
country) and real GDP per capita across countries. This association holds when they control for cultural
diversity, polarization, and segregation, while these three indices appear as non-significant.
We test the negative impact of diversity on the level of income when education is absent. However,
when education is present, we show that at certain level of secondary and tertiary education, the
marginal effect of diversity on income becomes positive, that is, education overcomes the negative
effect of diversity on income per capita.
Our main contributions include the following: First, the paper gives a new insight into the effects
of ethnic diversity on income by introducing the role of education as an enhancer of the possible
benefits derived from ethnic heterogeneity. Second, the results obtained show that education provides
the means to overcome the adverse effects of ethnolinguistic diversity on economic performance
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shown by the empirical literature at macro level. The results are robust when various indices of ethnic
diversity are employed: both for fractionalization indices and indices that include measures of the
distance between groups. Finally, we calculate the level of education required in order to reverse the
negative impacts of ethnolinguistic diversity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
calculate this magnitude.
In an increasingly diverse world, the results achieved in this paper are significant for policy
makers. Our results provide tools to handle diversity, while allowing its possible adverse effects to be
overcome and its benefits to be used to great advantage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the main theoretical arguments
on the effects of ethnic diversity. Section 3 describes the data and variables. In Section 4, the methodology
and results are presented, and finally, the discussion is offered and conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. The Effects of Ethnolinguistic Diversity and the Role of Social Cohesion. A Literature Review
From the theoretical point of view, there are different settings trying to model the positive and
negative effects of ethnolinguistic diversity. For example, Cerqueti et al. [18] consider a game with
bureaucrats, controllers, and entrepreneurs, producing a single commodity. The cost of monitoring the
activities of the agents plays a key role in their model. They assume that, on the one hand, heterogeneity
increases the cost of supervising, fostering corruption and harming economic growth but, on the other
hand, diversity increases the level of control between ethnic groups, facilitating control, reducing
corruption and then encouraging growth. From the proposed game, they conclude that there is a
non-linear relationship between ethnic diversity and growth: homogeneous and fragmented societies
are characterized by low economic growth and middle fragmented societies show higher growth rates.
Nevertheless, the theoretical framework closer to our paper is the one proposed by Alesina and
La Ferrara [7]. In their model, diversity generates both costs and benefits. On the one hand, ethnic
diversity brings about variety in abilities, experiences, and cultures that may lead to innovation and
creativity, which results in higher levels of productivity. To capture these benefits, they assume that the
skills of individuals from different ethnic groups enter as complementary in the production process of
the private goods, which, in turn, implies that more diversity encourages productivity. On the other
hand, diversity could give rise to conflicts of preferences, racist and xenophobic attitudes that cause
social unrest and discrimination to minorities. In order to overcome these problems, the policy makers
have to develop measures that are counterproductive for society because these measures require
resources that could be devoted to productive investments. These costs are introduced in the model
considering that individual utility depends not only on the consumption of private goods (where the
benefits of diversity are included), but also on a shared public commodity. The conflicts arise because
the preferences on the type of public commodity to provide are different among the several ethnic
groups. Therefore, the greater the diversity, the lower the utility from the consumption of public goods.
Alesina and La Ferrara [7] test the model for cross-sectional data on countries and localities in
the United States. The results differ depending on the level of disaggregation. At a country level, the
higher the ethnic diversity, the lower the growth rates, while across localities, the association between
the two variables is positive, as is also found by Sparber [19] for US cities. There are several studies
at city level that find a positive association between diversity and economic performance, such as
that by Ottaviani and Peri [20,21] for the US, Nathan [22] for the UK, Bakens [23] for the Netherlands,
and Suedekum et al. [24] for Germany. However they use the birthplace diversity as a measure of
heterogeneity, which, strictly speaking, is not the same as ethnolinguistic fractionalization. In fact,
even at a macro level, birthplace diversity is positively related to economic growth [25]. In this respect,
Montalvo and Querol [26] analyse the effect of the size of geographical units on the relationship
between ethnic diversity and economic growth. In the same way as Alesina and La Ferrara [7], they
find a positive relationship for small geographical areas. However, their results show that there is no
effect of diversity on growth for large areas and countries.
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In addition, Alesina and La Ferrara [7] also conclude that ethnic diversity can be beneficial (or,
at least, less detrimental) at higher levels of development. They argue that countries that are more
highly developed are more capable of capturing the benefits from ethnic heterogeneity, since the
diversification of the production process allows the variety of skills generated by ethnic diversity to be
used to greater advantage. Furthermore, richer countries are better prepared for absorbing the costs of
diversity that appear with more evidence at a macro level in terms of conflicts and social unrest since
they have the resources to develop better institutions in order to overcome these costs. Therefore, the
negative relation for cross-country studies could vanish in highly developed countries, because these
countries are better equipped to deal with diversity than are developing countries.
These arguments lead us to conclude that the effects of ethnolinguistic diversity depend on the
tools available to each society to handle such diversity. In this respect, and following Van Staveren
and Pervaiz [9], we underline the role of social cohesion as constituting one of these tools. From
theoretical and empirical perspectives, the literature shows that ethnic diversity can have both negative
and positive impacts on social cohesion (see Sturgis et al. [27] for a brief summary on this topic).
Along a different line of argumentation, we consider that social cohesion should not be confused with
homogeneity. We focus on the fact that education contributes towards social cohesion by providing the
tools that allow social cohesion to occur in a diverse world.
Social cohesion is a broad concept on which there is little agreement regarding what it precisely
entails. Schiefer and Van der Noll ([28], p. 595) review the literature on the concepts of social cohesion,
and determine its three main characterizing features. These essential features of social cohesion
are: (1) the quality of social relations (including social networks, trust, acceptance of diversity, and
participation); (2) identification with the social entity; and (3) orientation towards the common good
(sense of responsibility, solidarity, and compliance to social order).
Based on Van Staveren and Pervaiz [9], we focus on the first feature: the quality of social relations.
According to these authors, what matters for development is not so much the number of groups
but how groups relate to each other. As Alesina and La Ferrara ([7], p. 795) point out, “in a more
integrated world, the question of how different people can peacefully interact is the critical problem
for the next many decades”. Tolerance, trust, and cooperation among groups contribute towards social
cohesion through the avoidance, or at least the mitigation, of the potential conflicts that could arise
from diversity. Based on this argument, Buitrago et al. [10] consider that social cohesion could be
achieved in a heterogeneous society through tolerance, which might help the integration of all members
of a community, thereby overcoming any friction caused by heterogeneity. In the same vein, we
argue that education contributes towards social cohesion since it provides the instruments to become
more tolerant, cooperative, and trusting; it facilitates social networks [12]; and it reduces the cultural
distances between ethnic groups [11]. In this respect, for example, d’Hombres and Nunziata [29], using
the European Social Survey and Labour Force Survey data for the period 2002–2012, find that higher
levels of education contribute towards a more positive attitude towards immigrants.
Our hypothesis is that education enhances the positive effects of diversity on income, thereby
achieving the reversal of the negative sign of ethnic heterogeneity observed in cross-country studies.
In order to test our hypothesis, we will proceed as follows.
As a first step, we will check the standard results of the literature. If we denote DIVi as an index
of ethnic diversity, EDUCi as an index of education, and Xi as the matrix of control variables, then the
income per capita GDPi can be explained by Equation (1):
GDPi = β0 + β1DIVi + β2EDUCi + δXi + εi (1)
where the subscript i refers to country i. In expression (1), the marginal effect of diversity on growth is
given by β1, which empirical evidence finds to be negative. Our aim is to show that when education is
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present, once it achieves a certain level, the marginal effect of diversity becomes positive. Therefore, in
a second step, we introduce the interaction effect of diversity with education in Equation (2):
GDPi = β0 + β1DIVi + β2EDUCi + β3DIViEDUCi + δXi + εi (2)
In Equation (2), β3 measures how the level of education affects the relationship between ethnic
diversity and the income level. Our hypothesis is that the interaction is going to be positive. However,
this could be insufficient to balance the negative effect of diversity.
Therefore, as a third step, we calculate the marginal effect of diversity, given by Equation (3):
∂GDPi
∂DIVi
= β1 + β3EDUCi (3)
Equation (3) allows us to calculate the level of education required for (3) to be positive.
3. Data and Variables
We use a sample of 116 developing and developed countries (see Appendix A, Table A1). Those
countries for which data is available for all variables have been selected. In order to explain the
differences in the level of income, different indices of diversity are used, and the interaction with
different levels of education is studied. We also include two control variables.
3.1. Index of Diversity
As a proxy of ethnolinguistic diversity, we have taken the usual Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
Index, which measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group ([3], pp. 158–159):
Fraci = 1−
n∑
j=1
sij2 (4)
where sij is the share of group j (j = 1, . . . , n) in country i.
One of the most common indices used in the literature in this field is the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization index (ELF) provided by Taylor and Hudson [30], which jointly includes the linguistic
and ethnic features in order to classify the different groups. In a further step, Alesina et al. ([3],
p. 156) suggest that the ELF index relies largely “on linguistic distinctions, which may obscure other
aspect of ethnicity, like racial origin, skin color, etc.”. For this reason, these authors provide an ethnic
fractionalization index (ALE) based solely on ethnic characteristics and an index based strictly on
language (ALL) (they construct a third index based strictly on religion, but we are not going to consider
this dimension. Alesina et al. [3] find that religious fractionalization is non-significant or even appears
to be positively associated to income). However, the correlation between these indices and ELF is very
high. More precisely, in our sample, the correlation between ELF and ALE is 0.70, between ELF and
ALL is 0.84, and between ALE and ALL it is 0.72. Said authors find that both ethnic and linguistic
fractionalization indices are negatively related to the level of income.
In this paper, we select these two indices for ethnic and linguistic groups from Alesina et al. [3].
Moreover, to test the robustness of our results, we also use the ethnolinguistic fractionalization
index (ETFRA) constructed by Montalvo and Querol [13]. Based on Vanhanen [31], they aggregate
ethnolinguistic families according to genetic features. The level of disaggregation is lower than in
the indices of Alesina et al. [3]. Nevertheless, the correlation between indices is again very high: the
correlation of ETFRA with ALE is 0.86; that with ALL is 0.72; and its correlation with ELF is 0.70.
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These three indices (ALE, ALL, ETFRA) refer to a period that covers from the early to mid-1990s
and, as Alesina et al. [3] point out, they can be assumed to be stable over a 30-year horizon.
In our sample, the countries that show the highest degree of fractionalization (over 0.8) for all
three indices at the same time are Cameroon, Kenya, Liberia, and Uganda. These countries were
categorized as low- or lower-middle-income countries by the World Bank in 2016. The countries with
the lowest values for all three indices (below 0.1) are Bangladesh, Iceland, Japan, Norway, the Republic
of Korea, and Portugal. With the sole exception of Bangladesh, all of these countries are classified as
high-income countries.
The three fractionalization indices above fail to consider any degree of dissimilarity between
groups. In fact, if we consider two ethnic groups with the same language and religion, they are
generally less dissimilar than two ethnic groups with different languages and religions. Nevertheless,
this issue is not taken into account in the fractionalization indices. In the attempt to overcome
these shortcomings, there are alternative indices that strive to improve fractionalization measures
by including a measure of the distance between groups from different perspectives. In this respect,
among the most significant approaches, we can find the cultural index [14], the segregation index [6],
the polarization indices [13,15,16], and the ethnic inequality index [17].
From among these, we have chosen the ethnic inequality index (ETIN) due to the robust results
documented by Alesina et al. [17]. They find a strong negative correlation between ETIN and real GDP
per capita across countries. In addition, the negative association between the different measures of
ethnolinguistic diversity and income weakens with the inclusion of ETIN in the regressions.
The ethnic inequality index is an ethnic Gini index that measures the economic differences between
ethnicities coexisting in the same country. They use the luminosity per capita based on the satellite
image data on light density at night as a proxy for the income per capita of the ethnic groups. ETIN is
calculated as follows:
ETIN =
1
n
n + 1− 2
∑n
j=1(n + 1− j)yj∑n
j=1 yj
 (5)
where n denotes the number of ethnic groups and yj is the luminosity per capita of each group j.
From the years of available data, we select the data for 2000 because this data is closer to the three
indices of fractionalization considered in this paper. In our sample, the five countries with the highest
ETIN are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru, while those with the lowest include Bahrain,
Iceland, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, and Malta.
The correlation between ETIN and the fractionalization indices in our sample is low: 0.45 with
ALE, 0.36 with ALL, and 0.53 with ETFRA.
A first glance at our data shows that there could be an association between income and diversity.
Table A3 in the Appendix A shows the mean and the median for the four diversity indices when
countries are grouped in terms of level of income. The results indicate that the lower the income, the
higher the diversity indices. Furthermore, there are 24 countries with the four indices over 0.5. Of
these 24 countries, 16 are classified as having low income, seven as lower-middle-income countries
and only one, Gabon, is a upper-middle-income country. In contrast, there are 32 countries with the
four indices below 0.5, of which 20 are high-income countries, six are upper-middle-income, five are
lower-middle-income and only one, Burundi, is of low income. Of the high-income countries, there
are several striking cases, such as those of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland, which present all the
indices at over 0.5 except for ethnic inequality. In contrast, Australia, Chile, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden show only the ETIN index to be over 0.5. Finally, of the low-income countries, we find only
Burundi and Zimbabwe with at least one index below 0.5. For Haiti and Rwanda, there is no data for
ALL, but of the other three indices, at least two remain below 0.5. (See Appendix A, Tables A5 and A6
for details).
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3.2. Index of Education
As a proxy of education (EDUC), we employ the average number of years of schooling completed
among adult people over the age of 25 (EDUCT). Since we are interested in the level of education
required to balance the negative effect of diversity, the disaggregated data is also used, that is,
the average number of years of primary, secondary, and tertiary education completed (EDUC1, EDUC2,
and EDUC3, respectively). The data is taken from Barro and Lee [32] and is grouped into 5-year
intervals. We use the data corresponding to year 2000.
3.3. Control Variables
As control variables, on the one hand, we include the legal origin, following La Porta et al. [33].
They identify five possible legal origins: Common Law (British system), German commercial code,
Scandinavian commercial law, French commercial code (Civil law), and Socialist/communist law.
La Porta et al. [33] assert that the Common Law, and, to a lesser extent both the German and
Scandinavian legal systems, are based on the promotion of economic freedom and the defence and
respect for property rights. These features foster private initiative and limit the intervention of the
government in the economy. In contrast, the French commercial code and, to an even greater degree,
the Socialist/communist law were conceived to organize state intervention in the economy. This leads
to a weakening of the recognition of property rights and individual freedom and also hinders private
initiative by increasing bureaucracy. According to these arguments, La Porta et al. [33] show that
countries whose legal system is based on the French and Socialist/communist laws exhibit lower
income levels than countries with British and Nordic legal traditions.
In our sample, we identify 39 countries whose legal origin is the Common Law, 57 with the
Civil Law, 11 with the Socialist/communist law, with the German commercial code, and 5 with the
Scandinavian commercial law (see Appendix A, Table A1). This has led us to include a dummy variable
for the English legal origin, and another for the French legal origin, while the excluded dummy variable
corresponds to countries with Socialist, German, and Scandinavian legal traditions.
On the other hand, we have also selected openness as a control variable. Although it is true that
there is no agreement in the literature on the link between trade openness and economic performance,
Yanikkaya [34] argues that this lack of consensus arises, to a large extent, from the different ways of
defining openness. Of the five categories distinguished by Yanikkaya [34], this author points out that
research using openness as the sum of imports plus exports of goods and services as a percentage of
the GDP shows a positive relationship with economic growth (see, for example, [35,36]). Based on
these arguments, we have selected this measure of openness (data from World Bank). We employ the
five-year average for the same period as that used for education.
3.4. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the level of income measured by the log of the GDP per capita in
PPP (purchasing power parity) in constant 2011 international dollars, as taken from the World Bank.
To avoid a mechanical correlation with openness and education, the data for GDP is that of two
periods ahead.
The descriptive statistics for all the variables appear in the Appendix A (Table A2). Finally, Table 1
provides a summary of the variables included in the model, the index chosen, their acronyms, and
their source.
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Table 1. Data description and sources.
Name Variable Index/Description Source
LEVEL OF INCOME:
- GDPpc Log GDP per capita in PPP in constant2011 international dollars
World Development
Indicator (World Bank)
DIVERSITY INDEX (DIV):
- ALE Ethnic FractionalizationIndex
The probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country
will not belong to the same ethnic group
Alesina et al. [3]
- ALL LinguisticFractionalization Index
The probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country will
not belong to the same linguistic group
Alesina et al. [3]
- ETFRA EthnolinguisticFractionalization Index
The probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country
will not belong to the same
ethnolinguistic group
Montalvo and Querol [13]
- ETIN Ethnic Inequality Index
Ethnic Gini index that measures the
economic differences between ethnicities
coexisting in the same country
Alesina et al. [25]
EDUCATION INDEX (EDUC):
- EDUCT Total Education Index
Total average number of schooling years
completed among adult people (aged 25
and over)
Barro and Lee [32] dataset
- EDUC1 Primary EducationIndex
Average number of years of primary
education completed among adult
people (aged 25 and over)
Barro and Lee [32] dataset
- EDUC2 Secondary EducationIndex
Average number of years of secondary
education completed among adult
people (aged 25 and over)
Barro and Lee [32] dataset
- EDUC3 Tertiary EducationIndex
Average number of years of tertiary
education completed among adult
people (aged 25 and over)
Barro and Lee [32] dataset
LEGAL ORIGIN:
- COMMON LAW
- FRENCH LAW Legal origin
Five possible legal origins: the Common
law (British system), German
commercial code, Scandinavian
commercial law, the French commercial
code (civil law), and
Socialist/communist law
La Porta et al. [33]
OPENNESS:
- OPEN International openness Sum of imports plus exports of goodsand services as a percentage of the GDP
World Development
Indicator (World Bank)
4. Methodology and Results
Based on the results of the aforementioned literature, our starting point is that there is a negative
association between ethnolinguistic diversity and the level of income. As stated in Section 2, this
negative association could be overcome if diversity is handled in an appropriate way. More precisely,
we stress the role of social cohesion. Unlike Buitrago et al. [10], who focus on tolerance, and Van
Staveren and Pervaiz [9], who stress the inclusion of minorities, we point out that education promotes
all these values and constitutes the key element for handling diversity and obtaining all its benefits.
Therefore, our hypothesis is that diversity is negatively correlated with the level of income per capita
when education is absent, but positively correlated when education is present.
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In order to test this hypothesis, as a first step, we estimate Equation (6) using EDUCT as the index
for education:
GDPpci = β0 + β1DIVi + β2EDUCTi + δXi + εi (6)
The results appear in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) in Table 2. As expected, the marginal effect of
diversity on income (β1) is negative and significant for the four indices of diversity, and the impact of
education (β2) is positive.
In a second step, our aim is to verify whether education is capable of overcoming the negative
effect of diversity, and if so, at which level of education this occurs. To this end, we estimate Equation (7)
where we introduce an interaction term between diversity and an index of education (total education
and disaggregated levels):
GDPpci = β0 + β1DIVi + β2EDUCTi + β3DIViEDUCi + δXi + εi (7)
Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) in Table 2 show the results when we consider total education (total
average number of schooling years completed among adult people) in the interaction term. Although
the interaction term shows a positive coefficient (β3), it is significant only for ETIN. To test whether the
level of education is relevant, the disaggregated levels of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary)
are considered in the interaction term. The results in Table 3 suggest that the level of education attained
does indeed matter. When EDUC is the average number of years of primary education completed
among adult people, β3 is positive but non−significant; however, it is positive and significant both for
secondary and tertiary education.
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Table 2. Diversity and education.
Dependent Variable: GDPpc
ALE
Ethnic Fractionalization,
Alesina et al. [3]
ALL
Linguistic Fractionalization,
Alesina et al. [3]
ETFRA
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization,
Montalvo and Querol [13]
ETIN
Ethnic Inequality,
Alesina et al. [25]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DIV −0.46 *(−1.61)
−1.22 **
(−1.89)
−0.61 **
(−2.26)
−1.55 **
(−2.40)
−0.57 **
(−2.01)
−1.45 **
(−2.24)
−0.70 **
(−2.24)
−2.47 ***
(−2.76)
EDUCT 0.35 ***(13.04)
0.29 ***
(6.17)
0.33 ***
(11.65)
0.26
(5.25)
0.34 ***
(11.89)
0.27 ***
(5.04)
0.33 ***
(12.05)
0.22 ***
(3.61)
DIV × EDUCT 0.11(1.26)
0.15
(1.58)
0.14
(1.47)
0.23 **
(2.04)
Rob. Adjust. R2 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62
Adjusted R2w 0.773 0.781 0.774 0.777 0.791 0.801 0.771 0.787
Observ. 116 116 112 112 107 107 116 116
Notes: ***, **, * denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z−statistics are given within parentheses. Results are obtained with robust least squares
estimation using the method of Huber [37], which focuses on dependent variable outliers. We omit the results for control variables; these are available from the authors upon request.
Table 3. Diversity and disaggregated education.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GDPpc
EDUC1: Primary Education EDUC2: Secondary Education EDUC3: Tertiary Education
ALE ALL ETFRA ETIN ALE ALL ETFRA ETIN ALE ALL ETFRA ETIN
DIV −0.49(−0.8)
−0.72
(−1.19)
−0.64 *
(−1.06)
−0.99
(−1.3)
−1.39 ***
(−2.89)
−1.62 ***
(−3.52)
−1.54 ***
(−3.36)
−2.10 ***
(−3.54)
−0.83 **
(−2.33)
−1.15 ***
(−3.23)
−0.98 ***
(−2.78)
−1.58 ***
(−3.42)
EDUCT 0.34***(8.54)
0.32 ***
(7.65)
0.33 ***
(7.58)
0.32 ***
(6.72)
0.27 ***
(6.54)
0.24 ***
(5.52)
0.24 ***
(5.47)
0.23 ***
(4.83)
0.30 ***
(8.21)
0.26 ***
(6.68)
0.28 ***
(7.04)
0.25 ***
(5.87)
DIV*EDUC 0.00(0.05)
0.03
(0.20)
0.01
(0.12)
0.07
(0.43)
0.45**
(2.40)
0.52 ***
(2.66)
0.48 **
(2.55)
0.50 ***
(2.59)
1.23 *
(1.81)
1.80 **
(2.30)
1.21 *
(1.80)
1.71 **
(2.30)
Robust
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.62
Adjusted R2w 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.778 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.78
Observ. 116 112 107 116 116 112 107 116 116 112 107 116
Notes: ***, **, * denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z−statistics are given within parentheses. Results are obtained with robust least
squares estimation using the method of Huber [37], which focuses on dependent variable outliers. We omit the results for control variables; these are available from the authors upon
request. ALE, ALL, ETFRA, ETIN: see second row, Table 1.
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Nevertheless, as Brambor et al. ([38], p. 74) assert, “one cannot determine whether a model should
include an interaction term simply by looking at the significance of the coefficient on the interaction
term”. As these authors explain, when a multiplicative interaction model is employed, the focus is
much more on the marginal effect of the variable of interest on the dependent variable than on the
value and significance of the coefficients. In our case, we are interested in determining the level of
education at which this marginal effect becomes positive. Recall that the marginal effect of diversity is
given by Equation (8):
∂GDPpci
∂DIVi
= β1 + β3EDUCi (8)
In order to obtain the precise level of education, the standard error of Equation (8) is required.
This is given by:
σˆ =
[
var
(
βˆ1
)
+ EDUC2i var
(
βˆ3
)
+ 2EDUCicov
(
βˆ1βˆ3
)]0.5
(9)
We calculate the marginal effects with a confidence interval of 95%. Results in Figures 1 and 2
show that the effects of diversity become positive when a certain number of years of secondary and
tertiary schooling are attained: more precisely, more than four years for fractionalization measures and
five for ethnic inequality, and approximately a year for tertiary education (both dashed and solid lines
over zero) Similar results to those for fractionalization are obtained for the index of diversity proposed
by Fearon [14]. However, with the ELF index, the number of years is reduced to 2.5 for secondary
education and to 0.5 for tertiary education. The descriptive statistic for all countries and results for
estimations of (2′) are all presented in Appendix A (Tables A7 and A8). The results for estimations (3)
and (4) using ELF and the index of Fearon [14] are available from the authors upon request.
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Figures 1 and 2 omit the results for ALL and ETFRA because they are very similar to those of ALE,
and also omit the results with primary education, because years of primary education are not capable
of balancing the negative impact of diversity. (The results are available from authors upon request).
5. Discussion and Conclusions
A vast number of empirical studies show that ethnolinguistic diversity is negatively associated
to economic performance. In an increasingly heterogeneous world, these results are alarming. They
stress the potential adverse effects of diversity, and exacerbate xenophobic attitudes, which, in the
end, are extremely harmful. Hence, social welfare requires suitable policy measures to overcome any
possible negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity.
It is obvious that countries cannot decide their ethnic composition. However, this is not the point.
It cannot be concluded that the best of the scenarios would be a more homogenous society. What
matters for development is not so much the number of groups and the differences between them but
how groups interact. Therefore, the relevant issues that should be taken into account are related to
respect and tolerance between groups, the ability to generate social networks, trust, acceptance of
diversity, and participation. All these topics, as mentioned in the paper, correspond to a dimension
of social cohesion. In other words, we argue that it is social cohesion which is necessary for a better
economic performance, and social cohesion is highly relevant in a peaceful interaction between people,
with homogeneity being only a marginal issue.
From this perspective, we stress the role of education in providing the tools required to develop
the attitudes and behaviour that foster social cohesion. This allows heterogeneity to be discovered
as being much more enriching than homogeneity since it implies different skills and capacities and
different ways of approaching problems and solving them.
In order to test our hypothesis, a sample of 116 developing and developed countries and
several indices have been employed to measure ethnic diversity, both fractionalization indices
and indices that include a measure of distance between ethnic groups. A first look at our data
shows that the average for various ethnolinguistic diversity indices decreases from low−income
to high−income countries. Moreover, most of the countries with all indices over (below) 0.5 are
low−income (high−income) countries.
Our estimations, in line with the previous literature, show that the marginal effect of ethnolinguistic
diversity on income per capita is negative when education is absent. However, we find that the
presence of education is capable of mitigating the adverse effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on
the level of income. More precisely, the attainment of certain levels of education, especially secondary
and tertiary, succeeds in reversing the sign of the marginal effect of diversity on GDP per capita for all
indices used herein. Therefore, we respond affirmatively to the first two research questions laid out
in the introduction: (1) Can education manage to alleviate the adverse effects of ethnic diversity on
economic performance? and (2) Is education capable of reversing these adverse effects even when the
diversity indices that consider distance between groups are included in the analysis?
Furthermore, an answer to the third question (Which level of education is required in order to
overcome the possible adverse effects of ethnolinguistic diversity?) is also provided: We find that,
for fractionalization indices provided by Alesina et al. [3] and by Montalvo and Querol [13], more than
four years of secondary education and a year of tertiary education are required to reverse the negative
effect of fractionalization. This result is also confirmed for the fractionalization index proposed by
Fearon [14]. When the ethnic inequality index is used [17], which measures the economic differences
between ethnic groups in the same country, the number of years of secondary education required
increases by one year.
The results presented in this paper provide a new insight into the studies on the effects of
ethnolinguistic diversity on economic performance, by stressing the role of education as a means
of fostering social cohesion and, accordingly, by enabling the possible benefits derived from ethnic
diversity to be used to full advantage.
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Moreover, these results could shed more light on the debate on the effects of diversity and
on the responsibility of the Governments in handling diversity. Current societies are increasingly
heterogeneous, and, when properly managed, diversity might notably enrich both society and the
economy. In this respect, we have focused on social cohesion, and particularly on education, as one
of the main elements to be taken into account in the design of policy measures. Likewise, other
ingredients of social cohesion have been introduced in the form of tolerance and the inclusion of
minorities. The preliminary results obtained and the relevance of the topic in a world with growing
migratory flows pave the way for further research in this area. Moreover, the implications of the
qualitative aspects of education appear as a relevant issue that should be to take into account in further
research. In this sense, we intend to explore the effects of incorporating the characteristics of different
educational systems in our analysis.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Countries and legal origin.
Country Legal Origin Country Legal Origin
Afghanistan Civil law Lao Pdr Socialist/communist law
Albania Socialist/communist law Lesotho Common Law
Algeria Civil law Liberia Common Law
Australia Common Law Libya Civil law
Austria German commercial code Luxembourg Civil law
Bahrain Common Law Malawi Common Law
Bangladesh Common Law Malaysia Common Law
Belgium Civil law Mali Civil law
Benin Civil law Malta Civil law
Bolivia Civil law Mauritania Civil law
Botswana Common Law Mauritius Civil law
Brazil Civil law Mexico Civil law
Bulgaria Socialist/communist law Mongolia Socialist/communist law
Burundi Civil law Morocco Civil law
Cambodia Socialist/communist law Mozambique Civil law
Cameroon Civil law Nepal Common Law
Canada Common Law Netherlands Civil law
Central African Rep. Civil law New Zealand Common Law
Chile Civil law Nicaragua Civil law
China Socialist/communist law Niger Civil law
Colombia Civil law Norway Scandinavian
Congo, Rep. Civil law Pakistan Common Law
Congo, Dem. Rep. Civil law Panama Civil law
Costa Rica Civil law Papua New Guinea Common Law
Ivory Coast Civil law Paraguay Civil law
Cuba Socialist/communist law Peru Civil law
Cyprus Common Law Philippines Civil law
Denmark Scandinavian Poland Socialist/communist law
Dominican Rep. Civil law Portugal Civil law
Ecuador Civil law Qatar Civil law
Egypt, Arab Rep. Civil law Romania Socialist/communist law
El Salvador Civil law Rwanda Civil law
Fiji Common Law Saudi Arabia Common Law
Finland Scandinavian commercial law Senegal Civil law
France Civil law Sierra Leone Common Law
Gabon Civil law Singapore Common Law
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Table A1. Cont.
Country Legal Origin Country Legal Origin
Gambia Common Law South Africa Common Law
Ghana Common Law Spain Civil law
Greece Civil law Sri Lanka Common Law
Guatemala Civil law Swaziland Common Law
Guyana Common Law Sweden Scandinavian
Haiti Civil law Switzerland German commercial code
Honduras Civil law Tanzania Common Law
Hungary Socialist/communist law Thailand Common Law
Iceland Scandinavian Togo Civil law
India Common Law Tonga Common Law
Indonesia Civil law Trinidad & Tobago Common Law
Iran, Islamic Rep. Civil law Tunisia Civil law
Iraq Civil law Turkey Civil law
Ireland Common Law Uganda Common Law
Israel Common Law Un Arab Emirates Common Law
Italy Civil law United Kingdom Common Law
Jamaica Common Law United States Common Law
Japan German commercial code Uruguay Civil law
Jordan Civil law Venezuela, RB Civil law
Kenya Common Law Vietnam Socialist/communist law
Korea, Rep. German commercial code Zambia Common Law
Kuwait Civil law Zimbabwe Common Law
Note: Classification from La Porta et al. [33].
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics.
ALE ALL ETFRA ETIN Primary Secondary Tertiary Total GDPpc OPEN
Mean 0.43 0.38 0.44 0.44 4.07 2.23 0.35 6.65 19,041.16 82.79
Median 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.48 4.21 2.12 0.30 6.44 11,548.33 70.22
Maximum 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.94 7.91 5.41 1.57 12.93 13,2467.6 372.43
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.01 0.91 647.7947 21.65
Std. Dev. 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.24 1.56 1.30 0.30 2.91 21,178.82 50.08
Observations 116 112 107 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Notes: ALE: Ethnic fractionalization index, Alesina et al. [3]; ALL: Linguistic fractionalization index, Alesina et al. [3];
ETFRA: Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, Montalvo and Querol [13]; ETIN: Ethnic inequality index,
Alesina et al. [17].
Table A3. Diversity indices by level of income.
ALE ALL ETFRA ETIN
Low−income countrie
Mean 0.66 0.74 0.69 0.63
Median 0.70 0.79 0.75 0.63
Observations 20 18 20 20
Lower−middle−income countries
Mean 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.54
Median 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.53
Observations 28 27 25 29
Upper−middle−income countries
Mean 0.47 0.31 0.47 0.45
Median 0.51 0.30 0.48 0.42
Observations 30 29 25 30
High−income countries
Mean 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.25
Median 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.20
Observations 38 38 37 37
Notes: The classification has been made in accordance with the criteria of the World Bank. Table A4 shows the
countries included in each category. ALE, ALL, ETFRA, ETIN: see notes to Table A2.
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Table A4. Countries by level of income.
Low−Income Lower−Middle−Income Upper−Middle−Income High−Income
Afghanistan Bangladesh Albania Australia
Benin Bolivia Algeria Austria
Burundi Cambodia Botswana Bahrain
Central African Rep. Cameroon Brazil Belgium
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Bulgaria Canada
Gambia, The Ivory Coast China Chile
Haiti Egypt, Arab Rep. Colombia Cyprus
Liberia El Salvador Costa Rica Denmark
Malawi Ghana Cuba Finland
Mali Guatemala Dominican Republic France
Mozambique Honduras Ecuador Greece
Nepal India Fiji Hungary
Niger Indonesia Gabon Iceland
Rwanda Jordan Guyana Ireland
Senegal Kenya Iran, Islamic Rep. Israel
Sierra Leone Lao Pdr Iraq Italy
Tanzania Lesotho Jamaica Japan
Togo Mauritania Libya Korea, Rep.
Uganda Mongolia Malaysia Kuwait
Zimbabwe Morocco Mauritius Luxembourg
Nicaragua Mexico Malta
Pakistan Panama Netherlands
Papua New Guinea Paraguay New Zealand
Philippines Peru Norway
Sri Lanka Romania Poland
Swaziland South Africa Portugal
Tunisia Thailand Qatar
Vietnam Tonga Saudi Arabia
Zambia Turkey Singapore
Venezuela, RB Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad And Tobago
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Note: The classification has been made in accordance with the criteria of the World Bank (2016).
Table A5. Description of the diversity indices (I).
Countries with all Diversity Indices over 0.5 Countries with all Diversity Indices below 0.5
Country World Bank Classification Country World Bank Classification
Afghanistan 1 Austria 4
Benin 1 Bangladesh 2
Cameroon 2 Burundi 1
Central African Rep. 1 Costa Rica 3
Congo, Rep. 2 Cyprus 4
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 Denmark 4
Gabon 3 Dominican Republic 3
Gambia, The 1 France 4
Ghana 2 Greece 4
Indonesia 2 Hungary 4
Kenya 2 Iceland 4
Liberia 1 Ireland 4
Malawi 1 Italy 4
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Table A5. Cont.
Countries with all Diversity Indices over 0.5 Countries with all Diversity Indices below 0.5
Country World Bank Classification Country World Bank Classification
Mali 1 Jamaica 3
Mozambique 1 Japan 4
Nepal 1 Korea, Rep. 4
Niger 1 Malta 4
Pakistan 2 Mauritius 3
Senegal 1 Morocco 2
Sierra Leone 1 New Zealand 4
Tanzania 1 Papua New Guinea 2
Togo 1 Poland 4
Uganda 1 Portugal 4
Zambia 2 Saudi Arabia 4
Singapore 4
Spain 4
Sri Lanka 2
Swaziland 2
Tonga 3
Turkey 3
United Kingdom 4
Uruguay 4
Notes: 1: low−income country, 2: lower−middle−income country, 3: upper−middle−income country, 4:
high−income country.
Table A6. Descriptive Statistics. ELF and Fearon Index (FI).
ELF FI
Mean 0.44 0.46
Median 0.44 0.49
Maximum 0.99 1.00
Minimum 0.00 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.32 0.27
Observations 116 111
Table A7. ELF and Fearon Index (FI) by level of income (World Bank).
ELF CF
Low−income countries
Mean 0.69 0.68
Median 0.79 0.75
Observations 20 20
Lower−middle−income countries
Mean 0.52 0.49
Median 0.50 0.48
Observations 29 29
Upper−middle−income countries
Mean 0.34 0.44
Median 0.30 0.48
Observations 30 29
High−income countries
Mean 0.33 0.31
Median 0.27 0.27
Observations 37 33
Notes: The classification has been made in accordance with the criteria of the World Bank. Table A4 shows the
countries included in each category.
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Table A8. ELF and Fearon Index (FI) and disaggregated education.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GDPpc
EDUCT
Total education
EDUC1
Primary Education
EDUC2
Secondary Education
EDUC3
Tertiary Education
ELF CF ELF CF ELF CF ELF CF
DIV −0.68(−1.28)
−1.40 **
(−2.21)
0.03
(0.07)
−0.60
(−1.01)
−0.79 **
(−2.05)
−1.42 ***
(−3.15)
−0.30
(−1.01)
−0.87 **
(−2.54)
TEDUC 0.31 ***(6.80)
0.28 ***
(5.44)
0.36 ***
(9.34)
0.34 ***
(8.11)
0.28 ***
(7.19)
0.261 ***
(6.05)
0.32 ***
(8.49)
0.29 ***
(7.82)
DIV × EDUC 0.12(1.50)
0.14
(1.49)
0.0004
(0.003)
0.01
(0.09)
0.43 ***
(2.68)
0.48 ***
(2.61)
1.33 **
(1.98)
1.23 *
(1.84)
Robust
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.64
Adjusted R2w 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.77
Observations 116 111 116 111 116 111 116 111
Notes: ***, **, * denote that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z−statistics
are given within parentheses. Results are obtained with robust least squares estimation using the method of Huber
[37] which focuses on dependent variable outliers. We omit the results for control variables; these are available from
the authors upon request.
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